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SNYDER V. PHELPS, PRIVATE PERSONS
AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS: A CHANCE FOR THE
SUPREME COURT TO SET THINGS RIGHT*
W. WAT HOPKINS*
Thirty-two students and faculty members at Virginia Tech
were murdered on April 16, 2007, according to the Westboro
Baptist Church, because of their "proud sin." Six members of the
church showed up in Blacksburg, Virginia, one week before the
third anniversary of the killings to express that message, and the
message that "God sent the killer."' Church members also targeted
Morgan Harrington, a Virginia Tech student who was kidnapped
and murdered in 2009.2 The protest came one day after they
demonstrated at services for twenty-nine coal miners who were
killed in an explosion at the Upper Big Branch Mine near
Charleston, West Virginia.'
Such shenanigans are not unique for the church, which has
been using demonstrations since 1991 to spread its message that
* @ W. Wat Hopkins

*Professor of Communication, Virginia Tech; Roy H. Park Distinguished
Visiting Professor, School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1. Upcoming Picket Schedule, Westboro Baptist Church Web page,
http://www.godhatesfags.com/schedule.html (last viewed Apr. 7, 2010) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Picket Schedule].
2. See Tonia Moxley, Protesters Greeted by Crowds in Blacksburg,
ROANOKE TIMES, Apr. 10, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 7455110; Rex
Bowman, Parents: Morgan Harrington Likely Died Quickly, ROANOKE
TIMES, Jan. 28, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 1803026.
3. News Release, Westboro Baptist Church, WBC Will Picket West
Virginia's Worship of Dead Miners in Raleigh County, Thurs., Apr. 8 at 10:00
AM (Apr. 6, 2010), http://downloads.westborobaptistchurch.com (enter
verification code provided; follow "Downloads" hyperlink; follow "Flier
Archive" hyperlink; follow "20100406_West-Virginia-25-miners-dead-in-mineexplosion.pdf" hyperlink).
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tragedies like those at Virginia Tech and the Upper Big Branch
Mine and the deaths of American soldiers are God's will to punish
the United States for its toleration of the gay lifestyle.4 Legal efforts
to stop the picketing, for the most part, have been met with mixed
results, but the church is now facing a different type of counter
assault.
During its current term, the Supreme Court of the United
States is expected to decide whether the church should face liability
for intrusion and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Snyder
v. Phelps' drew some attention while it made its way through the
lower courts,7 but the certiorarigrant caused more than a few Court
watchers to raise their eyebrows.8 It seemed to be an unlikely
candidate for the high Court's attention for several reasons. First,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit gave
Westboro a resounding victory on First Amendment grounds,9 and
the case focused on issues that seemed to be relatively settled intrusion and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Westboro's foes ask the Court, for example, to invoke a relatively

4. See id.; About Westboro Baptist Church, http://www.godhatesfags.com
/wbcinfo/aboutwbc.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2010); News Release, Westboro
Baptist Church, WBC to Picket The Memorial of Morgan Harrington,
Virginia Tech Student Missing Since October! (Feb. 2, 2010),
http://downloads.westborobaptistchurch.com (enter security code provided;
follow "Downloads" hyperlink; follow "Flier Archive" hyperlink; follow
"20100202_Morgan-Harrington-Dead-VA-Tech-Student-Memorial-Mass-Feb5.pdf" hyperlink).
5. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
6. 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009), argued, No. 09-751 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2010).
7. See, e.g., David L. Hudson, Funeral Protests: Overview, FIRST AMEND.

CTR. (Oct. 2009), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/assembly/
topic.aspx?topic=funeral-protests (discussing Westboro's involvement in
protests and court cases on the topic including Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp.
2d 567 (D. Md. 2008), overruled by 580 F.3d 206 rev'd, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir.
2009), argued, No. 09-751(U.S. Oct. 6, 2010).
8. See, e.g., Howard Wasserman, Solove on Westboro, PRAWFsBLAWG
(Mar. 16, 2010, 8:54 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg
/2010/03/solove-on-westboro.html ("Why did the Court grant cert in this
seeming one-off case in which the First Amendment claimant prevailed?").
9. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 226. See also infra note 14 and accompanying text
(summarizing the facts and holding of the case).
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novel approach to intrusion, that is, to find that a person's seclusion
can be intruded upon even when the person is in public.o Intrusion
is generally thought to occur when a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy and there is an intrusion of a physical space
or of private affairs." Similarly, the Court's last tussle with
intentional infliction of emotional distress, Hustler v. Falwell,12
resulted in a ruling that greatly inhibits the effectiveness of the tort

10. See Daniel Solove, Snyder v. Phelps: Funeral Picketing, the First
Amendment, and the Intrusion Upon Seclusion Tort, CONCURRING OPINIONS
(Mar. 16, 2010, 10:58 AM), http://www.concurringopinions.com ("Generally,
intrusion doesn't involve speech. It involves invasive actions -snooping,
surveillance, trespassing. Where was the intrusion in this case?"). The claim is
tied in large part to the accompanying argument that funeral attendees make
up a captive audience. There is some support for the proposition. See Nat'l
Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 167-68 (2004) ("Burial
rites or their counterparts have been respected in almost all civilizations from
time immemorial.

. .

. Family members have a personal stake in honoring and

mourning their dead and objecting to unwarranted public exploitation that, by
intruding upon their own grief, tends to degrade the rites and respect they
seek to accord to the deceased person who was once their own." (citing 16
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 851 (15th ed. 1985) (citation omitted); 5
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 450 (1987) (citation omitted))); Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) ("The First Amendment permits the
government to prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when the 'captive'
audience cannot avoid the objectionable speech." (quoting Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 542
(1980))); Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 366 (6th Cir. 2008) ("[J]ust
as a resident subjected to picketing is 'left with no ready means of avoiding the
unwanted speech,' mourners cannot easily avoid unwanted protests without
sacrificing their right to partake in the funeral or burial service." (quoting
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) (citation omitted))); Stephen R.
McAllister, Funeral Picketing Laws and Free Speech, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 575,
590 (2007) (stating that "the captive audience concept may provide one of the
best rationales in support of funeral picketing laws . . ."); Njeri Mathis

Rutledge, A Time to Mourn: Balancing the Right of Free Speech Against the
Right of Privacy in Funeral Picketing, 67 MD. L. REV. 295, 332 (2008)
("Targeted picketing of a funeral is analogous to the targeted picketing of a
home."). While this topic may be worthy of further investigation, it is outside
the scope of this article. Similarly, this article does not confront the issue of
picketing at or near funerals.
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
12. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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claim, especially when it relates to public officials or public
figures.

1

Second, the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Snyder seemed to
securely entrench the First Amendment right of Westboro Baptist
Church to demonstrate at funerals and use highly offensive
language to attack private people. 14 The Supreme Court has ruled
that the First Amendment provides protection for the use of
despicable expressive attacks against public figures, but the Fourth
Circuit's ruling appears to extend that protection to attacks on
private persons. The Fourth Circuit, then, satisfied calls from some
First Amendment advocates for the expansion of the high Court's
protection in tort actions related to reputation or emotional
distress. "

13. See, e.g., Alicia J. Bentley, Comment, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell:
The Application of the Actual Malice Standard to Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress Claims, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 825, 839 (1988) (noting that the
majority's decision "clearly diminished the possibility of successful emotional
distress claims by public figures"); Heather Berger, Note, Hot Pursuit: The
Media's Liability for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Through
Newsgathering, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 459, 467-68 (2009) (noting the
Supreme Court's willingness to allow the First Amendment to be considered
more important than the tort); James R. Laguzza, Note, Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v. Falwell: Laugh or Cry, Public Figures Must Learn to Live with Satirical
Criticism, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 97, 108 (1988) (discussing the Supreme Court's
refusal to "impose an outrageousness standard in the realm of public and
political discussion").
14. See, e.g., Associated Press, 4th Circuit Nixes $5 Million Verdict
Against Funeral Protesters, FIRST AMEND. CTR., Sept. 25, 2009,
(summarizing
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=22120
Snyder v. Phelps and the Fourth Circuit's holding); Douglas Lee, 4th Circuit
Affirms Protectionfor Repulsive Speech, FIRST AMEND. CTR., Sept. 30, 2009,
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/commentary.aspx?id=22138 (discussing
the Fourth Circuit's decision to defend outrageous speech in Snyder v.
Phelps).
15. See Clay Calvert, War & lEmotional] Peace: Death in Iraq and the
Need to Constitutionalize Speech-Based IIED Claims Beyond Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 51, 63. (2008) (discussing whether
defendants should have the same protection in suits brought by private figure
plaintiffs as in suits brought by public-figure plaintiffs); Rodney A. Smolla,
Emotional Distress and the First Amendment: An Analysis of Hustler v.
Falwell, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 423, 425-27, 440 (1988) (calling for protection against
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Finally, only a year earlier, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari in another case favoring the free speech rights of
Westboro Baptist Church.' 6 The Court refused to hear the appeal
of an Eighth Circuit ruling that prohibited the enforcement of a law
restricting demonstrations near funerals." Members of the church
brought the original action, claiming the law restricting
demonstrations violated their First Amendment rights.' The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals did not rule on the
constitutionality of the law but found in favor of the church, holding
it unlikely that the law would survive constitutional scrutiny.19 No
wonder eyebrows were raised when the Court granted cert in
Snyder v. Phelps.
On the other hand, maybe the issues were not as clear-cut as
Court watchers seemed to think. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit
advanced some questionable propositions, possibly prompting the
Supreme Court's decision to hear the case.20

intentional infliction of emotional distress suits to be extended to some speech
against private-figures).
16. Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 545 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129
S. Ct. 2865 (2009).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 689 (Phelps-Roper of Westboro Baptist Church brought a claim
under 42 U.S.C. §1983 seeking a declaratory judgment, an injunction enjoining
enforcement of the law restricting demonstrations, and an award of costs and
attorneys fees.).
19. Id. at 694.
20. See Tony Mauro, Federal-ProtestCase to Test Boundaries , FIRST
AMEND. CTR., Mar. 9, 2010, http://www.firstamendment
center.org/analysis.aspx?id=22689 (writing that the Court's taking of the case
"could be a signal that it views unwelcome speech in the intensely private
setting of funerals-especially military funerals-as 'beyond what they are
willing to protect' (quoting University of Kansas law professor Stephen
McAllister)). See also Brief for Petitioner at 21, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751
(U.S. May 24, 2010); Brief for the State of Kansas et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 30, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751 (U.S. Jun. 1, 2010)
(calling the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of prior case law "dramatically
misread"); Jeffrey Shulman, Free Speech at What Cost?: Snyder v. Phelps and
Speech-Based Tort Liability, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 313, 314 (2010),
http://www.cardozolawreview.com/index.php?option=com
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SNYDER V. PHELPS

The lawsuit was filed by Albert Snyder against Fred W.
Phelps Sr., Westboro Baptist Church, and some of the church's
members, specifically Phelps's daughters, Shirley L. Phelps-Roper
and Rebekah A. Phelps-Davis.2' Phelps founded the church in 1955
and has been its only pastor. 22 Fifty of the church's sixty or seventy
members are Phelps's children, grandchildren, or in-laws.23
Members of the church express the belief that God hates
homosexuality and is punishing America- particularly the
military-for its tolerance of gays. 24
In 1991, church members began picketing funerals in order
to assert these beliefs. Since then, they claim to have protested
more than 44,000 times in opposition to "the homosexual lifestyle
of soul-damning, nation-destroying filth."2 5 Initially, the picketing

content&view=article&id=150:shulman2OlO3l3&catid=21:funerals-fire-andbrimstone&itemid=24 (criticizing the Fourth Circuit's decision in Snyder v.
Phelps).
21. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 569 (D. Md. 2008).
See also About Westboro Baptist Church,
22. Id. at 571.
http://www.godhatesfags.com/wbcinfo/aboutwbc.html (last visited Oct. 31,
2010) (describing the history and philosophy of the church).
23. Snyder, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 571. See also America's Most
Hated Family, BBC NEWS MAG., Mar. 30, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk
/2/hi/uk-news/magazine/6507971.stm (last visited Oct. 31, 2010) (interviewing
Loius Theroux, who directed a documentary on the Phelps family).
24. See Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 359 (6th Cir. 2008)
("Because God is omnipotent to cause or prevent tragedy, [church members]
believe that when tragedy strikes it is indicative of God's wrath." (quoting the
complaint)); Snyder, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 571.
25. About Westboro Baptist Church, supra note 22. The number of
protests grows rapidly. On Aug. 20, 2010, for example, the church had
announced twenty-two upcoming pickets through Oct. 5, 2010. Often multiple
pickets are staged within a single community, each lasting less than an hour.
See Picket Schedule, supra note 1. The Oct. 5 picket was at Arlington National
Cemetery, which, the church reported, "is the mother lode of dead soldiers for
this nation's death watch and worship of rotten dead carcasses. That
cemetery," the church continued, "is full of dead reprobates [sic] crooks,
cowards[,] and whoremongers (and thanks to the lazy brutes that run ANC,
many of those rotting carcasses now lie in a dog park with poo adorning their
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took place at funerals of persons who may have been gay or who
had beliefs with which the church members objected. The church
first gained national notoriety in 1998, for example, when members
protested at the funeral of Matthew Shepard, a man who had been
26
tortured and murdered after he made it known that he was gay.
Church members began picketing at military funerals in 2005,27 and
since the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, they primarily picket
funerals of persons who served in the military.2 8 They readily admit
that they choose military funerals because of the heightened
publicity caused by the protests. 29 Over the years, however, church
members have picketed organizations as diverse as the Southern
Baptist Convention, the ACLU, and the Billy Graham Evangelistic
Association, and persons as diverse as Coretta Scott King, Ronald
Reagan, William Rehnquist, and Fred Rogers. 3 0 They also target
Jews, who, they claim, have never repented for killing Jesus, and
mainstream churches that do not adhere to the narrow beliefs of
Westboro Baptist Church. 3 ' The church has been listed by the
32
Southern Poverty Law Center as one of six hate groups in Kansas,

graves.)" Id. The church also reported that it was on the road to the Supreme
Court, which had scheduled oral arguments in Snyder v. Phelps for Oct. 6. Id.
26. See Christina E. Wells, Privacy and Funeral Protests, 87 N.C. L. REV.
151, 159 (2008).
27. See id at 159-60.
28. See id. at 160; McAllister, supra note 10, at 575; The Most Hated
Family in America (BBC television broadcast Apr. 7, 2007),
http://topdocumentaryfilms.com/the-most-hated-family-in-america.
29. See Snyder, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 578 (D.MD. 2008); Mauro, supra
note 20. In its brief on the merits, the church reports that it pickets at funerals
because they are highly publicized events with extensive media coverage.
Brief for Respondent at 4, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751 (U.S. Jul. 7, 2010).
30. See Rutledge, supra note 10, at 302-03.
31. See An Open Letter to the Elect Jews, http://www.godhatesfags.
com/letters/20090512 openletterelectjews.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2010)
(on file with author); About Westboro Baptist Church, supra note 22.
32. Southern Poverty Law Center, Hate Map, http://www.splcenter.org
/get-informed/hate-map#s=KS (last visited Oct. 31, 2010). The six groups
include one Ku Klux Klan group, one Racist Skinhead group, and three NeoNazi groups. Id.
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and by the Anti-Defamation League as one of nineteen extremist
groups in the United States.
While Phelps remains the church's pastor, he has turned
over much of the day-to-day operations to his daughter, Shirley
Phelps-Roper, who is an attorney.34 Indeed, eleven members of the
Phelps family are attorneys, following in the footsteps of the family
patriarch, who was disbarred in Kansas in 1979 for alleged
misconduct.35 He continued to practice in federal courts until 1989
when, after a complaint by nine federal judges, he agreed to give up
that privilege in exchange for judicial authorities allowing family
-36
members to continue to practice.
Almost entirely because of the activities of the church,
Congress and a number of states have adopted statutes restricting
The church has
or prohibiting the picketing of funerals.37
challenged some of the statutes with mixed results.
But Albert Snyder took a different approach to the
activities of Westboro Baptist Church. He is claiming that by
picketing the funeral of his son, church members invaded his

33. Anti-Defamation League, Extremism in America - Westboro Baptist
Church: About WBC, http://www.adl.org/learn/extus/WBC/
default.asp??LEARNCat=Extremism&LEARNSubCat=Extremism inA
merica&xpicked=3&item=WBC (last visited Oct. 31, 2010).
34. See Picket Schedule, supra note 1.
35. Anti-Defamation League, supra note 33 (saying that Phelps was
disbarred for misrepresentations in a motion for a new trial); John Blake,
'Most Hated,' Anti-Gay Preacher Once Fought for Civil Rights, CNN,
http://edition.cnn.com/2010/US/05/05/hate.preacher/index.html?hpt=C2 (May
14, 2010) (saying that Phelps was disbarred for alleged witness badgering).
36. See Anti-Defamation League, supra note 33.
37. See McAllister, supra note 10, at 579, 614-19; Wells, supra note 26, at
153, 156; Hudson, supra note 7.
38. See, e.g., Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 545 F.3d 685, 688 (8th Cir. 2008),
cert. denied 129 S.Ct. 2865 (2009) (reversing a district court's denial of
injunctive relief for the church on grounds of the likely success of the church's
First Amendment claim); Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 373 (6th
Cir. 2008) (holding a funeral protest provision to be constitutional because it
was content neutral and narrowly tailored, because the state had a significant
interest in protecting funeral attendees, and because there were alternative
channels for the church's communication).
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privacy by intrusion and intentionally inflicted upon him severe
emotional distress.
The case began when members of the church demonstrated
at the funeral of Snyder's son, Marine Lance Corporal Matthew A.
Snyder, at St. John Catholic Church in Westminster, Maryland.40
Snyder had been killed in the line of duty in Iraq.4 1 Members of the
church carried signs specifically chosen for the picket: "Semper Fi
Fags," "Pope in Hell," and "Maryland Taliban." 42 Members also
brought a sign displaying a stylized image of two males engaging in
anal sexual intercourse.4 3 In addition, the church posted on its
website an "epic," titled "The Burden of Marine Lance Cpl.
Matthew Snyder." In the epic, the church alleged that Snyder's
parents "raised him for the devil" and taught him to defy God."
Church members had never met Snyder or his family.45
39. See Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 569-70 (D. Md. 2008).
40. See Id. at 569-70.
41. See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 211-12 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Snyder, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 569-70).
42. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751
(U.S. Dec. 23 2009). Petitioners alleged that the specific signs were added to
the signage arsenal of the church because church members knew that a funeral
service for a Marine was being held at a Roman Catholic Church in Maryland.
Id. Other signs displayed during the protest were "America is doomed,"
"God hates America," "You are going to hell," "God hates you," and "Thank
God for dead soldiers." Snyder, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 570. See also Brief for
Respondent, supra note 29, at 8 (describing the signs Westboro Baptist
Church brought to the protest). There is dispute over whether church
members also displayed a sign bearing the slogan "Matt in Hell." Petitioners
claim the sign was present. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Snyder v.
Phelps, No. 09-751 (U.S. Dec. 23, 2009). Church members, on the other hand,
deny displaying that particular sign, but argue that, even if they did, the sign
was not aimed at Matthew Snyder, but at Matthew Shepard, a gay man who
was tortured and murdered apparently because of his sexual orientation. See
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1-2, Snyder v. Phelps,
No. 09-751 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2010).
43. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 42, at 4.
44. Snyder, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 572. The epic also reported:
God rose up Matthew for the very purpose of striking him
down, so that God's name might be declared throughout
all the earth. He killed Matthew so that His servants
would have an opportunity to preach His words to the
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Phelps testified that members of the church learned of
Snyder's death and issued a press release announcing their
intention to travel to Westminster to picket the funeral.4 6 Albert
Snyder asserted that the church members turned the funeral into a
"media circus for their benefit." 47 They had notified law
enforcement officials in advance, he alleged, indicating their
recognition that their picketing would draw attention and might
cause a disturbance. 48 There was no disturbance, however, and
Albert Snyder was unaware of the pickets until he saw an evening
news program. 49
Snyder filed suit in federal court for the District of
Maryland for intentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion
upon seclusion, defamation, publicity given to private life, and civil
conspiracy."o The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants on the defamation and publicity claims." The district
court held that the statements made by the defendants consisted of
"religious opinion and would not realistically tend to expose Snyder
to public hatred or scorn." 5 2 In addition, no private information
had been made public.53 The jury found in favor of Snyder on the
remaining three claims - intrusion, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and conspiracy - and awarded him $2.9 million
in compensatory and $8 million in punitive damages.5 4 On a postverdict motion by the church, the district court reduced punitive

U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, the Maryland
legislature, and the whorehouse called St. John Catholic
Church at Westminster where Matthew Snyder fulfilled
his calling.
Lee, supra note 14.
45. Snyder, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 570.
46. Id. at 571.
47. Id. at 572.
48. Id.

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.

52. Id. at 572-73.
53. Id. at 573.
54. Id.

SNYDER V. PHELPS

2010]

159

damages to $2.1 million.5 ' The defendants had also asked the
district court to overrule the verdict, but the court found the
evidence sufficient to support the jury's verdict on each of the three
claims.56
The district court rejected the claim of Phelps and his
church that the funeral was a public event and that Matthew and
Albert Snyder became public figures because the father placed an
obituary notice in newspapers. Albert Snyder did not invite
attention, the court held, and the increased interest in the funeral
was primarily the doing of Phelps and his followers.5 ' They had
contacted law enforcement officials, the court noted, because of
past problems caused by their protests, and, indeed, their presence
resulted in increased police presence and media coverage. 59
"Defendants cannot by their own actions transform a private
funeral into a public event and then bootstrap their position by
arguing that Matthew Snyder was a public figure," 6 0 the court held.
The court also found that Albert Snyder's testimony
provided the jury with "sufficient evidence . . . to conclude that [he
had] suffered 'severe and specific' injuries," 6' and that those injuries
were caused by the "extreme and outrageous" conduct of Phelps
and his followers.6 2 In addition, the court found that there had
been intrusion on Snyder's seclusion because of the protest and the
posting on the website of the video about Matthew Snyder:
"[W]hen Snyder turned on the television to see if there was footage
of his son's funeral, he did not 'choose' to see close-ups of the
Defendants' signs and interviews with Phelps and Phelps-Roper,
but rather their actions intruded upon his seclusion." 63 The video,
the court held, invaded Snyder's privacy "during a time of

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 571.
Id. at 582.
Id. at 577.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 580-81.
Id. at 581.
Id.
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Finally, because there was evidence that the
bereavement."6
members of the Phelps family joined to accomplish unlawful acts,
61
there was evidence of conspiracy.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that
the speech of Westboro Baptist Church was protected by the First
or
Amendment, primarily because the speech was opinion
rhetorical hyperbole67 about matters of public concern. In making
its ruling, the court did not specifically address the torts alleged by
Snyder but lumped them together, finding that the First
Amendment granted virtually absolute protection "when a plaintiff
seeks damages for reputational, mental, or emotional injury...69
The court focused on the "context and general tenor of [the]
message"o and, in so doing, found Milkovich v. Lorain Journal
Co.,7 a libel case, to be "a crucial precedent." 7 2 " [N]o reasonable
reader," the court held, "could interpret any of the signs as
asserting actual and objectively verifiable facts about Snyder or his
son," and "they clearly contain imaginative and hyperbolic rhetoric
intended to spark debate about issues with which the Defendants
are concerned." 73 Similarly, the Web posting is protected because
"a reasonable reader would understand it to contain rhetorical

64. Id.
65. Id. at 581-82.
66. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 219-20 (4th Cir. 2009), argued, Snyder
v. Phelps, No. 09-751 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2010).
67. Id. at 220.
68. Id. at 222-23. The court explains that speech "which cannot
reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts" falls into two categories:
speech about "matters of public concern that fail to contain a 'provably false
factual connotation,"' Id. at 219 (quoting Milkovich v. Loraine Journal Co.,
497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990)) and rhetorical statements, Id. at 220. The court offers
protection for Westboro's speech because it falls within both categories, either
of which alone would be sufficient for First Amendment protection. Id. at
222-23.
69. Id. at 218.
70. Id. at 219.
71. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
72. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 218.
73. Id. at 223.
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hyperbole, and not actual, provable facts about Snyder and his

son." 7 4
The Fourth Circuit was critical of the district court for its
focus on issues raised by Snyder that were addressed in Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell5 and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 76 The district
court erred, the Fourth Circuit held, by basing its determination on
whether Snyder was a public or private figure and whether the
funeral was a public event. 77 The district court "focused almost
exclusively on the Supreme Court's opinion in Gertz, which it read
to limit the First Amendment's protections for 'speech directed by
private individuals against other private individuals.' The court
therefore assessed whether Snyder was a 'public figure' under Gertz
and whether Matthew's funeral was a 'public event.'"78
The public or private status of the plaintiff, the Fourth
Circuit held, was irrelevant to the case. 79 The focus, rather, should
have been on the nature of the speech.s Therefore, the Fourth
Circuit held, the district court should have focused on a line of
Supreme Court cases that afford protection to certain types of
speech and "[do] not depend upon the public or private status of
the speech's target.",8 The court continued:
[E]ven if the district court (as opposed to the
jury) concluded that Snyder and his son were
not "public figures," such a conclusion alone
did not dispose of the Defendants' First
Amendment contentions. In focusing solely on
the status of the Snyders and the funeral, and
not on the legal issue concerning the nature of
the speech at issue, the court failed to assess
whether the pertinent statements could
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
2008)).
79.
80.
81.

Id.
485 U.S. 46 (1988).
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
Snyder, 580 F.3d at 222.
Id. (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 577 (D. Md.
Snyder, 580 F.3d at 222.
Id.
Id.
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reasonably be interpreted as asserting "actual
facts" about an individual, or whether they
rhetorical
contained
merely
instead
82
hyperbole.
The Fourth Circuit seems to be making the point that Gertz
doesn't apply to the case because it is about defamation, and
Hustler doesn't apply because it is about public figures.8 The
Fourth Circuit, however, was advancing a proposition that the
Supreme Court had clearly shunned.
The proposition that the First Amendment requires a
heightened burden of proof in tort actions related to matters of
public concern despite the public or private status of a plaintiff is
contrary to the holdings of the Supreme Court. In Gertz, the Court
issued two holdings directly applicable to Snyder v. Phelps. First,
the Court rejected the proposition that private person libel
plaintiffs need to prove actual malice when their lawsuits grow from
debate over matters of public concern.8 4 Second, the Supreme
Court defined public figures - that is, those persons required to
prove actual malice in defamation cases."
The Fourth Circuit, however, by focusing on the nature of
the publication rather than the status of the plaintiff, appears to be
reviving the matters-of-public-concern rule for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, contrary to Gertz and Hustler. The Supreme
Court, in holding that the Rev. Jerry Falwell was a public figure,
distinguished between public and private persons and left intact the
burden of proof delineated for private persons in cases of
intentional infliction of emotional distress.86 Hustler, then, was as
much about private persons and intentional infliction of emotional
distress as about public persons. Instead of determining whether
Albert Snyder was a public figure, however, and subject to a
heightened burden of proof, the Fourth Circuit focused on whether
82. Id.
83. See Solove, supra note 10 (making the same point).
84. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974). See infra
notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
85. Id. at 345. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
86. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977). See also infra
notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
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the language employed by Westboro in its demonstration and its
87
Web posting consisted of provable statements, even though truth
or falsity is clearly irrelevant to an action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress."'
Gertz and Hustler, therefore, in tandem, provide
precedential guideposts for cases of intentional infliction of
emotional distress brought by private persons.
PRIVATE PERSONS FROM GERTZ TO HUSTLER

Gertz v. Welch is probably the Supreme Court's second
most important libel case, only to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 9
In that case, Gertz, the Court reaffirmed the protections the First
Amendment provides for critics of public figures who are involved
in public controversies." Often overlooked, however, is the fact
that the Court's holding concomitantly provided a degree of
protection for private persons who are attacked without voluntarily
entering what has been called "the rough and tumble of the
American ideological marketplace" 9 ' and unwittingly become
targets. Those persons are not required to confront the heightened
burden of proof in tort actions.
Attorney Elmer Gertz represented a family in a wrongful
death action against a Chicago police officer and was criticized for
doing so in American Opinion, an outlet for the John Birch

87. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
88. See Smolla, supra note 15, at 430 ("The emotional distress tort ... has
nothing to do with truth or falsity."); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 20, at 42
("The cause of action does not depend on whether the speech involved in the
tortious conduct is fact or opinion or whether it is true or false."); Brief of the
American Center for Law and Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither
Party at 8, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751 (U.S. Jun. 1, 2010) ("Falsity is not an
element of the torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) or
intrusion upon seclusion."); See also infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text
(discussing necessity to prove a statement false, and the Court's analysis of the
differing elements of falsity and intentional infliction of emotional distress).
89. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
See Kyu Ho Youm, Defamation, in
COMMUNICATION AND THE LAW 110 (W. Wat Hopkins ed. 2010).
90. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351-52 (1974).
91. Smolla, supra note 15, at 427.
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Society.9 A federal district court jury awarded him $50,000, but the
judge overruled the verdict on grounds that an appellate court
would likely find that Gertz was required to prove actual malice.93
In Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court had established the rule
that in order to win their cases, public official libel plaintiffs are
required to prove actual malice, that is, that an offending
publication was made with knowledge of falsity or with reckless
disregard for its truth.9 4 Three years later, in Curtis Publishing Co.
v. Butts," the Court extended the rule to public figures, though it
did not fully delineate public figure status.' In the 1971 case of
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 97 the actual malice rule was
expanded again.98 Writing for a plurality, Justice William Brennan,
who had written the opinion of the Court in Sullivan, held that
private persons involved in matters of public concern must also
prove actual malice in libel cases that grow from those issues. 99
Gertz appealed the district court's holding, and the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that Gertz failed to prove actual
malice. 0
The Gertz Court overruled Rosenbloom. The Court
reaffirmed that public debate is important and, therefore, some
falsehood must be protected "in order to protect speech that
matters."' 0' It rejected the Rosenbloom rule, however, holding that
the First Amendment does not require private people to prove
actual malice, even when involved in matters of public concern.
Each state, the Court held, so long as it does not impose liability

92. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325-26.
93. Id. at 329.
94. 376 U.S. at 279-80.

95. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
96. Id. at 155.

97. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
98. Id. at 52. See also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 76-77 (1964)
(expanding the actual malice rule to public officials involved in cases of
criminal libel).
99. 403 U.S. at 43-44.
100. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 418
U.S. 323 (1974).
101. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
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without fault, should determine the private-person fault standard

for libel plaintiffs. 10 2
In reaching its holding, the Court addressed the issue of
public and private persons in two ways. First, filling in a gap it had
left in Curtis Publishing Co., the Court delineated three types of
public figures for purposes of libel actions: public figures for all
purposes, that is, persons who have widespread fame or notoriety;
public figures for limited purposes, that is, persons who inject
themselves into ongoing public controversies in an effort to affect
the outcomes of those controversies; and involuntary public figures,
an "exceedingly rare" category of persons who become public
figures through no actions of their own.'o3
More importantly for purposes of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, however, the Court also affirmed that the First
Amendment does not require private persons to confront the same
burden of proof that it requires of public figures - at least in
defamation actions. Public figures, the Court held, have "greater
access to the channels of effective communication," making it easier
for them to take advantage of "the first remedy" available to
persons attacked by false defamations'" -

rebutting speech with

speech.105 "Private individuals are therefore more vulnerable to
injury, and the state interest in protecting them is correspondingly
greater."106 In addition, public figures, like public officials,
voluntarily expose themselves to a greater risk of criticism by
entering the public sphere; they invite public scrutiny and run the
greater risk that accompanies such scrutiny.'o7 A private person, on
the other hand, "has relinquished no part of his interest in the
protection of his own good name, and consequently he has a more
compelling call on the courts for redress of injury."'os Therefore,

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 347-48.
Id. at 345.
Id. at 344.
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951).
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
Id. at 344-45.
Id. at 345.
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the "public or general interest" test was inadequate in serving the
interests at stake.109
The Court re-emphasized that holding two years after Gertz
in Time, Inc. v. Firestone,"o rejecting arguments that Mary Alice
Firestone was a public figure because she was involved in a "cause
c6l6bre.""' "Were we to accept this reasoning," the Court held, "we
would reinstate the doctrine advanced [in Rosenbloom]," which was
repudiated in Gertz because the rule would unacceptably abridge a
legitimate state interest.11 Subject-matter classifications, the Court
held, often result in an improper balance. "It was our recognition
and rejection of this weakness in the Rosenbloom test which led us
in Gertz to eschew a subject-matter test.""' And nine years later, in
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,1 4 the Court
repeated the proposition: "In Gertz, we held that the fact that
expression concerned a public issue did not by itself entitle the libel
defendant to the constitutional protections of New York Times.""
There was no dispute that Elmer Gertz was involved in an
issue that caused considerable public interest. He had brought an
action against a Chicago police officer who had been convicted of
shooting and killing a young man.1 7 Gertz, however, was embroiled
in the controversy only because of his decision to represent a
particular client rather than to advance some agenda related to the
controversy, thereby satisfying the requirements of neither the allpurposes nor limited-purposes public figure test."' And,
significantly, he was not held to be an involuntary public figure."'
109. Id. at 346.
110. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
111. Id. at 454.

112. Id. at 454.
113. Id. at 456.
114. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
115. Id. at 756. The Court also repeated the proposition that "private
persons have not voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk" and "lack
effective opportunities for rebut[al]," so states still possess a strong interest in
protecting them. Id.
116. Id.
117. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 325 (1974).
118. Id. at 351-52.
119. Id.
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The dispute in Hustler Magazine v. Falwelll20 also involved
matters of public concern,' 21 and-as in Gertz - the Court
distinguished between public and private figures, leaving private
figures with a reduced burden of proof in actions for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
In Hustler, the Supreme Court unanimously held that public
officials and public figures must prove actual malice in order to win
damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress.122 The
Court overturned a $200,000 verdict against the magazine for the
publication of an attack aimed at the Rev. Jerry Falwell. Hustler
had published a parody of the Campari Liquor advertising
campaign in which it portrayed Falwell as having a drunken,
incestuous relationship with his mother.123 At the close of the
evidence, the United States District Court for the Western District
of Virginia granted a directed verdict for the magazine on the
invasion of privacy action, and a jury found in favor of Hustler on
Falwell's libel action, finding that the "parody 'could not reasonably
be understood as describing actual facts."' 24 The jury found in
favor of Falwell, however, on intentional infliction of emotional
distress, 12 and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.126
The Supreme Court reversed the holding, finding that the
parody was protected by the First Amendment. Key to the Court's
finding was the political nature of the publication. Falwell and Flynt
were embroiled in a political dispute. Falwell had targeted
pornography as a societal evil and Flynt, as one of its most
vociferous purveyors, responded.127 Chief Justice William
120. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
121. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA,

JERRY FALWELL v. LARRY FLYNT: THE
FIRST AMENDMENT ON TRIAL passim (1988).

122. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 56. Justice Anthony Kennedy took no part in
the case. Id. at 57. Justice Byron White concurred in the judgment but wrote
that the actual malice rule did not apply. Id. (White, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 48.
124. Id. at 49 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. Cl).
125. Id.
126. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1278 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom.
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
127. See SMOLLA, supra note 121, at 108 ("America's third major sin is
pornography.").
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Rehnquist compared the parody to the works of political
cartoonists and satirists who became involved in political debates
throughout history.128 Though the parody "is at best a distant cousin
. . . and a rather poor relation" to the works of Thomas Nast,

whose cartoons helped bring down the Tweed Ring and cartoonists
who lampooned George Washington, Franklin Roosevelt, and
Teddy Roosevelt, it is, nonetheless, deserving of the same
protection because of its political nature.12 In such political
disputes, the Court held "outrageousness" was insufficient for
liability3 () because sufficient "'breathing space'" is required to
encourage robust political debate.13 Therefore, in order to provide
that breathing space, the Court held that public figures and public
officials could not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress without proving actual malice - that the
material was published with knowing falsity or reckless disregard
for the truth.132
There is little dispute that Hustler was a significant ruling
that provided important protection for participants in robust public
debate. The parties in the case could not have stood in starker
contrast - one of the country's leading clergymen and one of the
country's most tasteless pornographers. In addition, few court
watchers would have guessed that key to the outcome of the case
would be an expansion of the actual malice rule, which at least two
of the sitting justices - including Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
author of the opinion of the Court - had eschewed as bad law.133
128. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 54-55.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 55. See also infra notes 173-177 and accompanying text.
131. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 52 (quoting Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. v.
Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 772 (1986)).
132. Id. at 56.
133. In an opinion concurring in the judgment in Dun & Bradstreet,Inc.
v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), Justice Byron White made
clear that he believed the actual malice rule should be overturned. Id. at 769
(White, J., concurring). He wrote that the rule "countenances two evils: "first,
the stream of information about public officials and public affairs is polluted
and often remains polluted by false information; and second, the reputation
and professional life of the defeated plaintiff may be destroyed by falsehoods
that might have been avoided with a reasonable effort to investigate the facts."
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One leading First Amendment scholar called Hustler "a classic first
amendment case."l 34 It "stands squarely in the tradition of Cohen
v. California as an important articulation of the first amendment
right to give offense," Robert C. Post wrote.135 And Rodney A.
Smolla wrote that the case was of "profound first amendment
significance."1 3 6 In his book on the case, Smolla wrote that it was a
landmark where "rubber meets the road, theory is pressed against
fact, abstract philosophical and legal principle is leavened by the
human side of the law." 13 7 It was cast, he wrote, "[a]s a cataclysmic
American contest between Good and Evil." 3 8
More important than the larger-than-life characters of Larry
Flynt and Jerry Falwell, however, were the constitutional principles
at stake. Just as the Supreme Court struggled in New York Times v.
Sullivan to find a way to fit the facts of that case into some kind of
constitutional protection for defamatory falsehoods, 3 9 the Court in
Hustler was required to find a way to provide protection for a
magazine that was "a parody of itself,"14 0 and whose publisher had

Id. at 769 (White, J., concurring). A year later, Chief Justice Warren Burger
also called for a reconsideration of the actual malice rule. Coughlin v.
Westinghouse Broadcasting & Cable, Inc., 476 U.S. 1187, 1188 (1986) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting), denying cert. to 780 F.2d 340 (3 d Cir. 1986). His dissent was
joined by Justice Rehnquist who, as Chief Justice, would write the opinion of
the Court in Hustler, expanding the rule. Id.
134. Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse:
Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REv. 601, 605 (1990).
135. Id. at 606.
136. Smolla, supra note 15, at 423.
137. SMOLLA, supra note 121, at 5.
138. Id. at 6.
139. See generally W. WAT HOPKINS, ACTUAL MALICE 18-24 (1989)

(analyzing Times v. Sullivan at the Supreme Court level, including the
problems facing the Court while writing the opinion); W. Wat Hopkins, Justice
Brennan,Justice Harlanand New York Times Co. v. Sullivan: A Case Study in
Supreme Court Decision Making, 1 COMM. L. & POL'Y 469 (1996) (delving
into the deliberation process of the Court during New York Times v. Sullivan,
and the overall importance of the decision).
140. See SMOLLA, supra note 121, at 60 (listing a "series of gems from
Hustler'spast").
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testified under oath that he had intended to assassinate the integrity

of Jerry Falwell.141
Falwell's lawsuit, as Smolla wrote, was "simply a public
figure striking back for intense distress suffered in the rough and
tumble of the American ideological marketplace,"1 42 but the
question was how to construct a suitable defense for targeted
attacks within that marketplace. The Court had used actual malice
to do so in libel law, but intentional infliction of emotional distress
was a different sort of beast - one for which truth or falsity was
irrelevant. 143 The challenge, Smolla wrote, was not to construct a
convincing rationale for rejecting Falwell's claim, but "how to
articulate limits on that rationale" that would permit suits for
emotional distress in other contexts. 1" Post put it similarly. The
question, he wrote, was how the differing elements of defamation
and intentional infliction could be superimposed to affect "the
world of debate about public affairs" protected by the First

Amendment. 145

141. The quote has become part of the lore of the case, appearing in a
multitude of sources since uttered by Flynt during a deposition. See, e.g.,
Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); SMOLLA, supra note 121, at 60; Diane
L. Borden, Invisible Plaintiffs: A Feminist Critique on the Rights of Private
Individuals in the Wake of Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 35 GONz. L. REV.
291, 308-09 (1999). At trial, Flynt backpedaled. He testified that he had no
personal animus toward Falwell and that there had been no intent to harm.
See SMOLLA, supra note 121, at 138-39 (reciting Flynt's claim that he did not
intend the parody to have "any effect" on Falwell). If he had intended to
harm Falwell, Flynt testified, there would have been an investigation to locate
actual harmful facts. Id. at 138. By then, however, the damage had been
done. Smolla wrote that the videotape of the deposition became "the single
most important piece of evidence" at trial. Id. at 29. Ironically, Flynt's quote
asserting that he had intended to assassinate Falwell's integrity did not appear
in the opinion of the Court.
142. Smolla, supra note 15, at 427.
143. See id. at 430 ("The emotional distress tort .

.

. has nothing to do

with truth or falsity."); Brief of the American Center for Law and Justice,
supra note 88, at 8.
144. Smolla, supra note 15, at 427.
145. Post, supra note 134, at 612.
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It is not clear that the actual malice rule was the best choice
for achieving that goal. It is a test that requires a statement of fact
rather than a statement of opinion. That is, there can be neither knowledge of falsity nor reckless disregard for the truth without the
establishment of a statement that is, indeed, false, as the Court
noted when it established in 1986 that libel plaintiffs involved in
matters of public concern must prove falsity.146 Actual malice,
therefore, would appear to be inappropriate for the statements
expressed in the Hustler parody, which were not subject to a test of
truth or falsity. 147 As Rodney Smolla wrote:
One cannot speak meaningfully about the
publisher's subjective doubt as to truth or
falsity when neither the initial decision-making
process of the publisher nor the subsequent
injury to the plaintiff has anything to do with
the truth or falsity of the communication or
with its capacity to inflict reputational

damage.148
The focus on the Times case, Smolla wrote, might have done
more harm than good, "for fitting the Times formulation into
Falwell v. Flynt created an insoluble conundrum; it was forcing a
square peg into a round hole."149
Beyond that, Hustler had specifically announced that the
parody was not factually true, and that the magazine was aware of
146. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986).
147. Indeed, as previously indicated, Falwell lost his libel action because
the jury specifically determined that the "parody could not 'reasonably be
understood as describing actual facts."' Hustler v. Fallwell, 485 U.S. 46, 49
(1988) (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. Cl.). See also Shulman, supra note 20,
at 315 (writing that "[t]here is no justification for applying the actual malice
standard to emotional distress claims outside the public arena . ..."). But see

Brief of the American Center for Law and Justice, supra note 88, at 9
(reporting that Rev. Falwell claims Hustler magazine had published "an
extremely distressing lie").
148. SMOLLA, supra note 121, at 170. See also Smolla, supra note 15, at
427 (writing that "[t]his matter cannot be resolved merely by superimposing
the defamation fault rules of New York Times and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
upon the cause of action for infliction of emotional distress.").
149. SMOLLA, supra note 121, at 171.
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that fact. At the bottom of the page on which the parody appeared,
Hustler printed the disclaimer, "ad parody - not to be taken
seriously," and the magazine's table of contents listed the ad as
"Fiction; Ad and Personality Parody.""" Clearly, then, Hustler
published the parody knowing it contained false statements of fact
-

that is, with actual malice."'

That point was made during oral arguments in the case.
Alan L. Isaacman, the attorney for Hustler, was specifically asked
whether the actual malice standard had been satisfied by Falwell
because everyone knew the ad was false, "including the speaker." 52
Isaacman replied that the actual malice rule did not apply because
the parody contained no false statement of fact - that it did not
purport to state facts.' Some justices did not seem convinced, yet
the Court still adopted the actual malice rule for public persons
who bring actions for intentional infliction of emotional distress.154
The irony of that adoption has been recognized by a
number of authorities. W. Wat Hopkins, for example, wrote that
the ruling in Hustler means the actual malice standard applies, not
simply to material that is knowingly false, but to material that is
intended to deceive. 1s There was no intent to deceive -only an
intent to harm. As Flynt had put it, the parody was an attempt to
assassinate Falwell's reputation,156 though it did not fit within the
parameters of the actual malice rule. Actual malice, Justice
150. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 48 (quoting the disclaimer from the ad).
151. Justice White did not join the opinion of the Court. He concluded
that Times v. Sullivan had little to do with the case: "[T]he ad contained no
assertion of fact." Id. at 57 (White, J., concurring ).
152. Transcript of Oral Arguments, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,
reprinted in 181 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 751, 757 (Philip B.
Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds. 1989) (1987 Term Supp.).
153. Id. at 758.
154. The adoption of the rule was ironic for another reason, as previously
indicated. At least two members of the sitting Court had publicly advocated
the abandonment of the test. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
155. W. Wat Hopkins, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell and Standards of
Proof (Old and New) in Cases of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,
30-31 (Apr. 1989) (paper presented at the AEJMC Southeast Colloquium,
Chapel Hill, N.C.) (on file with author).
156. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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Brennan had written, was an intent to inflict harm through
falsehood.'57 Had Larry Flynt and Hustler intended to deceive
readers, actual malice would have been at issue. There was no
intent to deceive, however, so the Court held that the parody was
not published with actual malice.' Indeed, the Fourth Circuit held
in Hustler that Times v. Sullivan did not emphasize truth or falsity
but, instead, emphasized culpability, and the actual malice standard
served to provide a level of protection in intentional infliction cases
equivalent to that in libel cases. 5 9
While that theory may be sound, the ruling begs the
question of how the actual malice test could be applied to opinion
or rhetorical hyperbole, that is, to intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Smolla called the application of actual malice to
the emotional distress claim "nonsensical."'60 The question, Smolla
writes, is not how the Sullivan standard applies to the facts in the
case, but how the First Amendment should be applied to "restrict a
state's decision to impose penalties for this sort of conduct in
relation to this sort of risk."l 6' The answer, he writes, is a cardinal
principle: "[T]he power of speech to generate severe emotional
disturbance on issues of public concern is never enough, standing
alone, to justify abridging that speech, even when the infliction of
emotional disturbance is intentional."l 62
That's not the result of Hustler, however, though the Fourth
Circuit seems to think that it is.163 The Supreme Court did not
157. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964).
158. See HOPKINS, supra note 139, at 36-37.
159. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1274 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom.
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
160. Smolla, supra note 15, at 439. See also SMOLLA, supra note 121, at
128.
161. Smolla, supra note 15, at 439.
162. Id. at 440. See also, CALVERT, supra note 15, at 63 (writing that the
Hustler protections should be extended to speech that "is both political and
centers on a matter of public concern").
163. The Fourth Circuit cited two Supreme Court cases for its assertion
that the Supreme Court had provided protection for speech related to matters
of public concern without regard for public or private status - Milkovich v.
Lorain Journaland Hustler. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 218 (4th Cir. 2009,
argued, No. 09-751 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2010). But neither citation supports the
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specifically refer to private persons, but it clearly extended the
actual malice rule only to public officials and public figures,'4 and it
did not extend any added protection to speech simply because that
speech involved matters of public concern. Indeed, as previously
noted, the Court rejected just such a rule in Gertz v. Welch,
specifically overturning the Rosenbloom rule. 6 1
The Court's narrow ruling in Hustler means that privateperson plaintiffs in cases of intentional infliction of emotional
distress need not prove actual malice to win damages.'" Because a
heightened protection applies to cases involving public persons and
not to cases involving only matters of public concern, a court in
such a case must determine whether a plaintiff is a public or private
person. The finding by the federal district court in Maryland that
Albert Snyder was a private person, therefore, was essential to the
outcome of his intentional infliction case,16 a proposition simply
ignored by the Fourth Circuit.'16 As Jeffrey Shulman writes, "The
status of the plaintiff and the content of the defendant's speech are
as inseparable as the dancer from the dance." 69
The Fourth Circuit in Snyder seemed to be expanding the
rules of Hustler to all emotional distress tort actions involving
matters of public concern. Such a ruling would be contrary to the
Supreme Court's holding in Gertz overruling a similar proposition

assertion. Milkovich
reports only that the Court has recognized
"constitutional limits on the type of speech which may be the subject of state
defamation actions," 497 U.S. 1, 16 (1990), and Hustler reports only that the
First Amendment recognizes "the fundamental importance of the free flow of
ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern," Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988). Neither assertion is as broad as
that advanced by the Fourth Circuit.
164. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 56.
165. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
166. As Post notes, Hustler "holds only that nonfactual ridicule is
constitutionally privileged from the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress if the plaintiff is a public figure or public official, and if the ridicule
occurs in 'publications such as the one here at issue."' Post, supra note 134, at
662 (quoting Hustler, 485 U.S. at 56).
167. See discussion supra notes 76-88 and accompanying text.
168. See Shulman, supra note 20, at 326.
169. Id. at 331.

20101

SNYDER V. PHELPS

175

advanced in Rosenbloom and to resulting trends in other lower
appellate lower courts. 170
Even if that was the design of the Fourth Circuit, however,
Albert Snyder was not a party to a debate on a matter of public
concern.
FREE SPEECH AND EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

The free speech doctrine of the Supreme Court has made it
clear that speech cannot be punished because it embarrasses,
offends, or simply causes hurt feelings."' "[I]n public debate," the
Court has held, "our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even
outrageous, speech in order to provide 'adequate "breathing space"
to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment."" 72 Indeed, the
Court has held that in some instances, the very purpose of free
speech is to cause offense. In Terminiello v. Chicago,173 for example,
Justice William 0. Douglas wrote for the Court that:

170. See, e.g., Barrett v. Outlet Broad. Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726, 748 (S.D.
Ohio 1997) (holding that there is no unfettered right to broadcast even
matters of public concern); State v. Carpenter, 171 P.3d 41, 59 (Alaska 2007).
Even speech that relates to a matter of public interest
loses its protection and can give rise to an intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim if, in addition to
meeting the other requirements for an intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim, it is uttered with an
intent merely to harass and with no intent to persuade,
inform, or communicate.
171. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982)
("Speech does not lose its protected character . . . simply because it may

embarrass others."); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978)
("[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for
suppressing it. . . . Some uses of even the most offensive words are

unquestionably protected."); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)
("[U]nder our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be
prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their
hearers.").
172. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (quoting Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988)).
173. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
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[A] function of free speech under our system of
government is to invite dispute. It may indeed
best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to
anger. Speech is often provocative and
challenging. It may strike at prejudices and
preconceptions and have profound unsettling
effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. 174
This very point was made in Hustler. Chief Justice
Rehnquist's advocacy for the rights of satirists and others who
attacked the governmental hierarchy recognized the place of
outrageous speech in debate on matters of public concern.
"[R]obust political debate," he wrote, will inevitably produce
speech that is not necessarily "reasoned or moderate." 75 Both
public officials and public figures will be subject to attacks that are
"'vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp."' 76 While
recognizing that the parody produced by Hustler was outrageous,
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that in the area of public debate
involving public figures, "'outrageousness' was an insufficient test

of liability. 177
Although he didn't cite it, the Chief Justice was referring to
the test for intentional infliction of emotional distress described in
section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 17' After delineating
the burden of proof for the tort, 179 the Restatement quaintly reports
that liability can only attach if the actions of the publisher are such
that they would cause an observer to exclaim, "'Outrageous!"'"s0

174. Id. at 4.
175. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 51.
176. Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270

(1964)).
177. Id. at 55.
178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977).
179. Id. at § 46 ("One who by extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is
subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other
results from it, for such bodily harm.").
180. Id. at § 46 cmt. d.
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Hustler, then, provided additional protection for debate on
matters of public concern -protection for which the Court has long
recognized to be "[a]t the heart of the First Amendment."'s' The
Court has emphasized that the First Amendment "embraces at the
least the liberty to discuss publicly . . . all matters of public

concern,",182 and such expression "has always rested on the highest
rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.""' Implicit in
this template, however, is the related proposition that other speech
occupies lower rungs in that hierarchy. Indeed, the Court has
specifically said that "not all speech is of equal First Amendment
importance."l84 Fighting words"' and obscenity, 16 for example,
have no First Amendment protection, while commercial speech, 1 7
indecent speech,' intimidating speech, 8"' and speech "on matters
of purely private concern"" are protected, but have less protection
than speech involving matters of public concern.
181. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 50. See also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145
(1983) (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982);
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)) (stating that speech on matters of
public concern is "entitled to special protection").
182. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940).
183. Carey, 447 U.S. at 467.
184. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
758 (1985).
185. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)
(defining fighting words as "those which by their very utterance inflict injury
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace").
186. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that
"obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or
press").
187. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec., Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980) (holding that "[t]he Constitution . . . accords a lesser

protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed
expression").
188. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978) ("The ease
with which children may obtain access to broadcast material . . . amply

justif[ies] special treatment of indecent broadcasting.").
189. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 363 (2003) (holding
constitutional a statute outlawing cross burning done with the intent to
intimidate).
190. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
759 (1985).
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In Hustler, therefore, the Court recognized the importance
of debate on matters of public concern, and did so in a momentous
way. It's clear, for example, that public officials and public figures,
under the Hustler rubric, will have an exceedingly difficult time
sustaining their burdens of proof in cases of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The burden, one scholar wrote, has become
"almost insurmountable"' 9 ' because "there is almost no way that a
public figure will be able to show actual malice" when the offending
language can be characterized as satire or caricature.192 "[I]t is
anomalous," he writes, "to allow recovery to public figures upon
proof of the defendant's knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard
for truth when no actual facts are being asserted."' 93 Indeed, though
probably an overstatement, theoretically at least, one scholar
opined that the Hustler Court had extended absolute protection to
satire, parody, and similar speech when it involves public debate
about matters of public concern.194
It would be an error, however, to read Hustler as completely
gutting the law as it applies to intentional infliction of emotional
distress. While recognizing the importance of speech on matters of
public concern, the Court has also recognized that some speech
does not rise to the level of public debate. Personal abuse, for
example, "is not in any proper sense communication of information
or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution."' 95 In Hustler, then, the
Court was silent on some issues related to the tort of intentional
infliction, and it left others intact. The Court, as Smolla writes, "was
quite careful to limit the decision to public officials and public
figures."1 96 Post agrees. He writes:
The opinion tells us almost nothing about
whether the Constitution protects outrageous
191. Laguzza, supra note 13, at 113; see also Bentley, supra note 13, at
839 (writing that "it is difficult to think of many situations where a public
plaintiff could establish intentional infliction of emotional distress but not
defamation").
192. Laguzza, supra note 13, at 111.
193. Id. at 111-12.
194. See Borden, supra note 141, at 314.
195. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
196. Smolla, supra note 15, at 427.

SNYDER V. PHELPS

2010]

179

communications that are privately disseminated
rather than displayed in the pages of a
nationally distributed magazine [referring to a
publication "such as the one here at issue"], or
whether it protects outrageous communications
that are designed to hurt or embarrass private
figures, or whether it protects communications
that, although injuring the same emotional
tranquility as that safeguarded by the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, are
also violative of similar torts like invasion of

privacy.197
In addition, Post writes, "It cannot be that Falwell
absolutely protects all verbal means of intentionally inflicting
emotional distress, all forms of racial, sexual, and religious insults,
so long as the offending communications do not contain false
factual statements."' 9 That is, the case did not eliminate the tort,
although it may have done so as a practical matter for public
persons. Jerry Falwell would have won his case, had it not been for
the heightened burden of proof imposed by the Court. Indeed,
Falwell did win his case until that burden was imposed. First
Amendment scholar Diane L. Borden also suggests that the
"invisible" person in the case-Falwell's mother, Helen-would
have won an intentional infliction case, had she been alive when the
parody was published.1 99 The Court did not specifically address
private persons in Hustler, Borden points out,200 but that does not
197. Post, supra note 134, at 615.
198. Id. at 662.
199. Borden, supra note 141, at 314. The Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press makes the same point, but, oddly, implies that First
Amendment guarantees would be harmed if she had successfully sued Hustler
magazine. Brief Amici Curiae of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press and Twenty-One News Media Organizations in Support of
Respondents at 20-21, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751 (U.S. Jul. 14, 2010).
200. Borden, supra note 141, at 293. See also Bentley, supra note 13, at
839 ("The Court had no opportunity to discuss whether the Falwell decision
should be read to require a showing of actual malice in order for a private
plaintiff to recover punitive damages for emotional distress due to an offensive
'public issue' publication.").
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mean that private persons automatically face a heightened burden
of proof. To the contrary, she notes, "[I]f the Court's logic were to
be consistent, a private person would be required to meet a lower
standard of fault than would a public person." 20 ' The extension of
that logic, another authority writes, may also mean that private
persons eventually have to prove actual malice in order to recover
2102
punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Some courts have applied just such logic. A 2007 ruling by
the Alaska Supreme Court, for example, makes intentional
infliction claims that turn on truth or falsity subject to the same
limitations as defamation.203 Therefore, the court ruled, actual
malice is required in Alaska when such cases involve matters of
public concern.204 The heightened protection does not apply when
201
claims do not involve such matters. Similarly, the Utah Supreme
Court ruled in 1992 that private persons must prove negligence in
order to sustain actions for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, since that is the burden of proof for private persons
bringing actions for defamation in Utah.206 And a federal district
court in New York, applying that state's law, ruled that private
persons bringing intentional infliction actions involving matters of
public concern must prove gross irresponsibility, the same standard
as private persons in defamation actions.
Some authorities argue that to ensure robust and open
debate, the First Amendment should bar damage awards in cases of
intentional infliction of emotional distress when the issues involved
are matters of public concern.208 For example, Smolla writes, "the
power of speech to generate severe emotional disturbance on issues
of public concern is never enough, standing alone, to justify

201. Borden, supra note 141, at 314.
202. See Bentley, supra note 13, at 840.
203. State v. Carpenter, 171 P.3d 41, 55 (Alaska 2007).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 56.
206. Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 906 (Utah
1992).
207. Chaiken v. VV Publig. Corp., 907 F. Supp. 689, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
208. See Calvert, supra note 15, at 63. See also Borden, supra note 141, at
314 (arguing that the Court has already established that rule).
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abridging that speech, even when the infliction of emotional
disturbance is intentional." 20 9 The clear intent of the Court,
however, is to provide sturdy protection for debate on matters of
public concern.
That was the rationale for the holding in
Terminiello,210 for the rules established in Gertz,2 11 and for the
212
additional protection provided in Hustler.
Snyder v. Phelps is not about debate. While the rights and
privileges of gay persons and the war in Iraq are certainly matters
of important public concern,2 13 the facts of the case do not indicate
that the plaintiff was involved in the debate. Albert Snyder is a
private person who became the target of an expressive attack
without voluntarily entering a public debate, or, as a matter of fact,
without participating in a public debate at all. As the Court made
clear in Gertz, whether a libel case relates to matters of public
concern is irrelevant when the plaintiff is a private figure. 2 14 And, as
the Court made clear in Hustler, only public figures and public
officials are required to prove actual malice in cases of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.215 When private persons bring such
suits, actual malice is not an issue, and, therefore, it is irrelevant
whether the offending language involves matters of public concern
or whether the language constitutes statements of fact or
statements of opinion. The questions are whether the publisher through action or speech -intentionally intends to inflict serious
emotional harm on a specific person and whether the conduct or
speech is outrageous.

209. Smolla, supra note 15, at 440.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 173-74. See also Boos v. Barry,
485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (citing Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56
(1988)) (noting that in public debate, citizens must tolerate insulting speech in
order to provide "'breathing space' to the freedoms protected by the First
Amendment").
211. See supra text accompanying notes 90, 101, 104-05.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 126-32, 176-77.
213. See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 223 (4th Cir. 2009), argued, No.
09-751 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2010); Calvert, supra note 15, at 66; Shulman, supra note
20, at 314.
214. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
215. Hustler,485 U.S. at 56.
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Albert Snyder's involvement in any debate over the
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq or gays in the military was
certainly less than Elmer Gertz's involvement in any sort of debate
over the shooting of a Chicago resident by a police officer.
Westboro Baptist Church alleges that Snyder is a limited-purpose
public figure, 216 but does not show the requisite connection between
the Snyders and such matters-simply making the allegation is
insufficient.217
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

The Restatement (Second) of Torts reports: "One who by
extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes
severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such
emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it,
for such bodily harm." 2 18 This generally translates into a four-part
burden of proof. Thus, to succeed in a cause for action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove:
(1) the defendant's conduct was intentional or reckless; (2) the
conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the conduct caused
emotional distress; (4) the emotional distress was severe.219
The tort, Smolla writes, evolved to cover facts that would
2211
it
not fit comfortably into other, more traditional legal actions.
serves two purposes, Post writes: "it . . . provides relief for those
[who] . . . have been threatened by uncivil behavior, [and] it also

serves to safeguard those 'generally accepted standards of decency
and morality' that define for us the meaning of life in a 'civilized
community."' 2 2 1 Therefore, there may be instances when
outrageous speech is sufficient for the award of damages, even if
222
the speech is true. Because satire and other forms of commentary
216. Brief for Respondent, supra note 29, at 32.
217. Shulman, supra note 20, at 332.
218. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977).
219. See Hustler, 485 U.S. at 50 n.3 (citing Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270,
1275 n.4 (4th Cir. 1986)).
220. SMOLLA, supra note 121, at 72.
221. Post, supra note 134, at 624 (internal citations omitted).
222. See Laguzza, supra note 13, at 110.
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are not intended to be taken literally, however, truth or falsity may
be deemed irrelevant to an intentional infliction claim. Under a
standard of "outrageousness," damages could be awarded on the
basis of opinion or rhetorical hyperbole, if the speech is particularly
heinous and targeted at an individual.223
Indeed, in some
224
circumstances, publication is not necessary.
Application of the burden of proof for intentional infliction
of emotional distress demonstrates that Albert Snyder deserves to
win his cause of action against Phelps and the Westboro church.22 5
Intentional and Outrageous Conduct
The intentional nature of the conduct of the members of
Westboro Baptist Church is without dispute. The church, which has
made a practice of picketing the funerals of dead military personnel
because members believe such protests to be a particularly effective
226
means of conveying their message,
issued a press release and
traveled from Kansas to Maryland in order to picket at Matthew

Snyder's funeral.227
There is little dispute that the activities of the church
members were outrageous.228 They selected signs specifically to
target the Snyder funeral - signs that identified the Snyders as
living in Maryland -and attacked them because they were Roman

223. See id. at 113. See also State v. Carpenter, 171 P.3d 41, 56-57 n.44
(Alaska 2007) (noting that statements of opinion are protected unless they
constitute harassing conduct).
224. See Bentley, supra note 13, at 839.
225. For discussion purposes here, the first two elements of the burden of
proof are considered together and the third and fourth elements are
considered together.
226. See Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 359 (6th Cir. 2008).
227. See Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571 (D. Md. 2008).
228. The Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression
is one disputant to the proposition. In its brief supporting the Westboro
church, the center argues that the picketing was neither extreme nor
outrageous. Amici Curiae Brief of the Thomas Jefferson Center for the
Protection of Free Expression et al. in support of Respondents at 16, Snyder v.
Phelps, No. 09-751 (U.S. Jul. 14, 2010).
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Catholics and because Matthew Snyder was a Marine. 229 A video of
their activities, produced by a British journalist and posted on the
Internet, demonstrates not only the outrageous behavior of the
church members, but their intent to be outrageous. 230
After the protest, the church posted a video on its website
attacking Matthew Snyder and his family. Church members may
have taken no specific action to draw the attention of Albert
Snyder to the posting, 231' but that is irrelevant. No one associated
with Hustler magazine notified Jerry Falwell of the publication or
drew his attention to it. One would not expect Falwell to be a
reader of Hustler, and he became aware of the parody because of
questions from a reporter,2 32 just as Snyder became aware of the
church's activities when he watched a news program. By virtue of
publishing the parody, Hustler had demonstrated its intent to cause
severe emotional distress. Similarly, the highly publicized
demonstration followed by the publication of the video on the
Internet ensured notice of the attack to millions of peoplecertainly to more people than the single issue of Hustler magazine
could reach.2 33
Sufficient evidence exists, therefore, to demonstrate that
Westboro intended to attack Snyder through a publication that was
clearly outrageous. 234
229. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 20, at 4. This selection
of signs seems to at least establish the likelihood that persons were, indeed,
targeted. Id. Daniel Solove writes, to the contrary, that Westboro's speech
was not "specifically directed at particular individuals." Solove, supra note10.
230. Louis Theroux, Westboro Baptist Church - World's Most Famous
Calvinists (1 of 8),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hmIr9P-vkSQ,
YouTUBE (Aug. 23, 2009)(posting of BBC documentary titled "The Most
Hated Family in America").
231. The Thomas Jefferson Center argues that the posting of the video
was "entirely lawful," and the church "is not liable for IIED . . . for exercising

[its] legal rights in a permissible way." Brief for the Thomas Jefferson Center,
supra note 228, at 20.
232. See SMOLLA, supra note 121, at 1.
233. Though the statistics are now out of date, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844, 849-53 (1997); provides a nutshell report of how the Court views the
Internet and the content distributed thereby.
234. Even some defenders of Westboro's First Amendment rights admit
that the contents of the video were outrageous. The amicus brief filed with
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Causality - Severe EmotionalDistress
A plaintiff in an intentional infliction case must demonstrate
severe emotional distress that was caused by the defendant. The
element of severe emotional distress is often misinterpreted. Fourth
Circuit Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III, for example, wrote that the
intentional infliction tort should not allow for damages "for no
other reason than hurt feelings." 235 Daniel Solove writes that the
fact that a person becomes "very upset" by speech "is outweighed
by the First Amendment protection of free speech." 236 And Smolla
would support a holding that, in order for damages to be awarded
in a speech case, there must be palpable evidence of some harm
237
64
"other than"
emotional distress. Similarly, in an amicus brief to
the Fourth Circuit supporting the Westboro church, the Thomas
Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Speech argues that,
even though the content of the views expressed may have
constituted "'extreme and outrageous conduct,"' because the claim
was "based entirely on a distaste for the Phelps' views," the
messages should enjoy First Amendment protection.2 3 8
These assessments underestimate the impact of the requisite
outrageous conduct. The tort targets speech that is particularly
heinous, is directed at an individual, and causes injury considerably
greater than "hurt feelings" or a feeling of being "very upset." The
outrageousness of the conduct relates to speech that is much more
than "personally unpleasant or disagreeable," 239 or "mere insults or

the Fourth Circuit by the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free
Expression reports, "The content of the Phelps website may be considered
'extreme and outrageous'; however, the act of posting is not." Brief for the
Thomas Jefferson Center, supra note 228, at 28. Daniel Solove also wrote that
Westboro's speech "was certainly odious . . . and caused Snyder emotional
distress." Solove, supra note 10.
235. Falwell v. Flynt, 805 F.2d 484, 484 (4th Cir. 1986) (Wilkinson, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc), rev'd sub nom. Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
236. Solove, supra note 10.
237. Smolla, supra note 15, at 440.
238. Brief for the Thomas Jefferson Center, supra note 228, at 30.
239. Post, supra note 134, at 625.
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offensive messages." 24" The claim is not based on distaste for the
message; it is based on the targeted attack on private persons.
While it is true that citizens in a free society must tolerate much
offensive speech, and damages should not be awarded because of
mere offensiveness,2 41 the threshold for intentional infliction of
emotional distress extends well beyond those descriptors. The issue
is not offensiveness; it is outrageousness. 242
The burden of proof for the tort delineated in the
Restatement, and expanded by the warning that a reasonable person
would exclaim "outrageous" upon learning of the actions of the
243
demonstrate the rigor of the burden of proof for the
speaker,
tort. The impact of the speech must extend well beyond mere upset
feelings, and the actions of the speaker must extend well beyond
being simply offensive. 244 "Even if a defendant's conduct is
outrageous and intentional," First Amendment scholar Robert E.
Drechsel writes, "liability will not attach unless the emotional
distress is severe." 2 45 The distress "must be far more than minor

240. Solove, supra note 10.
241. See id.
242. A number of sources mistakenly report that the tort would punish
offensive speech, using "offensiveness" as a synonym for "outrageousness."
See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of the Reporters Committee for Freedom, supra
note 199, at 4, 11; Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars of First Amendment Law in
support of Respondents at 5, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751 (U.S. Jul. 14, 2010);
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress Tort, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 300, 300-303 (2010),
http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/VOLOKH_2010_300.pdf;
Christina Wells, Regulating Offensiveness: Snyder v. Phelps, Emotion, and the
First Amendment,
1
CAL.
L.
REV.
CIR.
71
(2010),
http://www.californialawreview.org/assets/pdfs/Circuit/wells.pdf.
243. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1977). Even the
Thomas Jefferson Center reports that recovery for the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress is extremely rare. Brief of the Thomas
Jefferson Center, supra note 228, at 16.
244. See Bass v. Hendrix, 931 F. Supp. 523, 531 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (noting
that mere insults and hurt feelings are insufficient to sustain liability); Valadez
v. Emmis Commc'ns, 229 P.3d 389, 394 (Kan. 2010) ("The law will not
intervene where someone's feelings merely are hurt.").
245. Robert E. Drechsel, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress:
New Tort Liability for Mass Media, 89 DICK. L. REv. 339, 345 (1985).
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discomfort." 24 6 Indeed, the Kansas Supreme Court recently held
that "the absence of psychiatric or medical treatment .

.

. weighs

against a finding of extreme emotional distress." 247 An award of
damages cannot be made, the court held, simply because of
"[ellevated fright, continuing concern, embarrassment, worry, and
nervousness." 248 The tort "is something very like assault. It consists
of the intentional, outrageous infliction of mental suffering in an
extreme form." 249 The Restatement reports that "[t]he law
intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no
reasonable man could be expected to endure it." 2 50 The Kansas
Supreme Court further stated that "[the] conduct must be
outrageous to the point that it goes beyond the bounds of decency
and is utterly intolerable in a civilized society." 2 51 The speech is
being used as a weapon, and, like "false rumors [and] invasions of
privacy," such "direct attacks . . . should be actionable."252 Rather
than being tantamount to firing a warning shot over the head of an
individual, it is tantamount to firing that shot at the individual.
Some courts have been slow to allow damage awards in such
actions, because emotional distress "is not readily quantifiable and
[is] difficult to diagnose objectively."2 53 Robert Post, for example,
246. Id. at 346.
247. Valadez, 229 P.3d at 395 (citing Roberts v. Saylor, 637 P.2d 1175,
1181 (Kan. 1981)).
248. Id. See also Bass v. Hendrix, 931 F. Supp. at 532 (indicating that
symptoms like psychological problems, suicidal tendencies and post-traumatic
stress would be required for a finding of severe emotional distress).
249. William Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New
Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 874 (1939), quoted in Drechsel, supra note 245, at
339.
250. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1977).
251. Valadez, 229 P.3d at 394.
252. Solove, supra note 10.
253. See SMOLLA, supra note 121, at 71. See also Drechsel, supra note
245, at 340-43 (discussing the historical reluctance of American courts to
recognize emotional distress suits, and noting "problems of judicial
procedure" as one reason). Drechsel also found that cases involving the
media rarely turn on causality or severe emotional distress because plaintiffs
have extreme difficulty overcoming the outrageousness standard. Id. at 34748. In many cases, however, severe emotional distress is also an onerous
burden to overcome. See, e.g., Barrett v. Outlet Broadcasting, Inc., 22 F.
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complains that causality is usually satisfied by the plaintiff's
testimony, and neither the burden of causality nor the burden of
proving severe emotional distress is onerous: it is "generally
satisfied by a plaintiff's simple recitation that he has been upset." 25 4
Post uses Jerry Falwell as an example: "Falwell's mental anguish
was minimal, to say the least." 255 Rodney Smolla, on the other hand,
found "[t]he intensity of Falwell's distress . . . convincing." Falwell

testified that he was on the verge of tears and would have likely
attacked Flynt had he seen him. 25 6 There "was certainly ample
257
record evidence to affirm the jury award," Smolla wrote. Smolla's
assessment was based on Falwell's testimony that he had never
been so angry as when he saw the parody - anger that continues
"[t]o this present moment."258 Yet another scholar found the
parody the equivalent of "a psychological battery." 25 9
Regardless of the dispute, evidence of Snyder's emotional
distress was even more compelling than that of Falwell. He testified
that he is often tearful and angry and becomes so sick that he
actually vomits. 260 He said he cannot separate thoughts of his son
from the signs at the demonstration, and that he believes his
emotional injury to be permanent.26 The district court judge also
reported that Snyder was often "reduced to tears" during the trial,
was "visibly shaken and distressed," and was granted the
opportunity several times to leave the courtroom "to compose
himself." 2 62 "The jury," the judge wrote, "witnessed firsthand
Supp. 2d 726, 749-50 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (finding evidence of severe emotional
distress in the case of four out of five plaintiffs); Valadez, 229 P.3d at 395
(finding evidence of emotional distress, but not severe emotional distress).
254. Post, supra note 134, at 622.
255. Id.
256. Smolla, supra note 15, at 432.
257. Id. at 433.
258. Id. at 432.
259. R. George Wright, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell and the Role of the
FirstAmendment, 19 CuMB. L. REV. 19, 21, 23-24 (1988).
260. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 588 (D. Md. 2008).
261. Id. at 588-89. Much of this description was also quoted by the
Fourth Circuit, Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 213 (4th Cir. 2009), argued,No.
09-751 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2010).
262. Snyder, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 589.
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Plaintiff's anguish and the unresolved grief he harbors because of
the failure to conduct a normal burial." 263 In addition, expert
witnesses testified that Snyder's diabetes had worsened and his
depression deepened as a result of the actions by church members,
"thereby preventing him from going through the normal grieving
process." 264
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has struck a reasonable balance
between the interests of private person libel plaintiffs and the need
to protect robust debate about matters of public concern. There is
no dispute that libel law is mired with problems in both theory and
21
practice. Differentiating between private and public figures265 and
between matters of public and private concern are among those
266
Definitional problems aside, however, a strong
problems.
argument can be made that private persons - however they are
defined -should not confront the same onerous burden of proof as
public figures or public officials. It's clear that public people
voluntarily inject themselves into matters of public concern and
part of assuming public person status is the willingness to accept
-267
such a risk.
Private people, on the other hand, are private. Arguably,
they sometimes are involuntarily embroiled in matters of public
concern, and when that happens, possibly, they should face the
263. Id.
264. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 213-14.
265. See Post, supra note 134, at 669 (writing that, although the public
official branch of the public person distinction is relatively clear, "the 'public
figure' branch is ambiguous, half justified by the notion that speech about
public figures is normatively relevant to democratic self-governance, and half
by the notion that speech about public figures concerns matters of 'notoriety'
that have, in a purely descriptive sense, already caught 'the public's
attention').
266. See id. at 670 (writing that the Court itself demonstrated the difficult
task of determining what matters are of public concern by rejecting the
Rosenbloom rule in Gertz).
267. See W. Wat Hopkins, The Involuntary Public Figure: Not So Dead
After All, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 23-27 (2003).
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same burdens as public persons.2 68 When they are simply targets,
however, it is both unfair and legally illogical to saddle them with
the same burdens as public persons, even when the issues used to
attack them involve matters of public concern.
The proposition that intentional infliction of emotional
distress actions should be barred when they grow from matters of
public concern - or that, at a minimum, the actual malice standard
should apply to such actions - grows, in part, from the notion that
there must be some harm other than emotional distress in order for
there to be liability; 269 after all, it's only speech. The defense
strategy in the Hustler case, for example, was to minimize the
offending publication, with a kind of, "C'mon, [Jerry], loosen up can't you take a joke?" 270 Hustler, to some degree, encouraged the
attitude that speech must cause some harm other than emotional
distress. A similar attitude -skepticism that words could cause
psychological harm - prevailed early in the history of privacy
law, 271 and it needs to be put to rest.
Andrew Bickel argued that speech is too important for such
272
a short shrift: speech matters because it always has consequences.
"There is such a thing as verbal violence," he writes, "a kind of
cursing, assaultive speech that amounts to almost physical
aggression, bullying that is no less punishing because it is
simulated." 273 Such speech "constitutes an assault. More, and
equally important, it may create a climate, an environment in which
conduct and actions that were not possible before become

possible." 27 4
Regardless of whether one accepts Bickel's argument, one
foundation of First Amendment jurisprudence is that speech is a
significant force in society. As previously noted, speech related to
268. See id. at 44-49.
269. See Smolla, supra note 15, at 440.
270. See SMOLLA, supra note 121, at 21.
271. See Samuel A. Terilli, Jr. & Sigman Splichal, Privacy Rights in an
Open and Changing Society, in COMMUNICATION AND THE LAw 301, 303-04
(W. Wat Hopkins ed., 2010 ed.); Drechsel, supra note 245, at 340-43.
272. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 72 (1975).
273. Id.
274. Id.
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self-governance is given added protection because of its impact on
the marketplace of ideas; some speech is regulated or restricted
because it does not contribute to a self-governing function, that is, it
does not contribute to the search for truth; speech is so important
that even false speech has some freedom in order to protect speech
that matters; other speech is prohibited because its very utterance is
likely to cause harm or some immediate breach of the peace; speech
can be restricted because it is threatening, or, absent a true threat,
because it can be intimidating.
Speech can also cause severe emotional distress. The
children's ditty that "words will never hurt me" is a fallacy. Words
do hurt. Sometimes the hurt is justified and results from a public
debate in which participants know the risks. Other times, however,
speech is used to target innocent bystanders. When it is, and when
the result of the speech is that those bystanders suffer severe
emotional distress, they deserve some remedy in law.
The speech of the Westboro Baptist Church is problematic,
but not because it involves matters of public concern. The speech is
not utterly without redeeming social value; it is not knowingly false;
it may be speech that matters. Indeed there is some evidence that
the activities of the church promote positive speech. Responses in
opposition to the church's demonstrations have included welcoming
songfests 275 and prayer meetings. 276 The speech is problematic
because it is an intentional, outrageous assault designed to cause
severe emotional distress.
The distinction has been made between public and private
persons in libel law, and private persons - even when involved in
matters of public concern - do not face a heightened burden of
proof in order to prevail in libel actions. The same buffer should
apply in cases involving intentional infliction of emotional distress.
It does not advance the cause of free expression to allow
outrageous attacks on private persons who have not entered the
fray of public debate. Similarly, as Shulman notes, "[t]he speech-

275. See Brock Keeling, Lowell HS Students Counter Protest Westboro
Church, SFIsT, Jan. 29, 2010, http://sfist.com/2010/01/29/lowellhsstudents
counterprotest.php.
276. See Moxley, supra note 2.
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based emotional distress suit does not operate to restrict public
discourse; it restricts only the use of speech to inflict injury, the use
of words as weapons."277
Albert Snyder was not embroiled in debate over a matter of
public concern when attacked by the Westboro Baptist Church he was a mourning father doing no more than attempting to bury
his son in peace. That right was denied to him because of the
designed efforts of church members to intentionally inflict severe
emotional distress upon him. The boundaries of intentional
infliction cases should be narrowly drawn, but the Snyder case falls
into even the most narrow of those boundaries, and the Supreme
Court should say so.

277. Shulman, supra note 20, at 336.

